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THAYNE LARRY WALKER,
Petitioner and Appellee,
V•

Priority No. 13
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF,
CORRECTIONS; SCOTT CARVER, UTAH
BOARD OF PARDONS; MIKE SIBBETT,
AND BOARD MEMBERS THEREOF,

Case No. 940140-CA

Respondents and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (Supp. 1994) , which grants this
Court original appellate jurisdiction over appeals from "orders on
petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons."

Walker was originally committed to the Utah

State Prison on a second-degree felony; therefore, this Court has
jurisdiction.

1

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court apply the wrong standard of review to
Walker's petition

for quasi-appellate

review

of

the Board's

revocation proceeding?
PRESERVATION OF ISSVE
Appellants did not know the court was going to use an improper
standard of review until after the decision; however, appellants
did inform the court of the proper standard of review in its
answer, R. 35-62, and in oral argument before the trial court (Tr.
Hearing before Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki, Walker v. State, Case No.
930904964, Jan. 15, 1993, at 16).
STANPARP OF REVIEW
The choice of a standard of review is a legal conclusion that
this Court can review for correctness.

State v. Pena. 869 P. 2d

932, 936 (Utah 1994); State v. Warden. 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah
1991) .
STATUTES
All relevant statutes are attached to this brief in Addendum
A.

2

RE07EST FOR ORAL AROVMENT ANP PTOLISBEP OPINION
The Board requests oral argument and a published opinion
because neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court have issued
an opinion that sets out the appropriate standard of review in rule
65B petitions that challenge a parole revocation hearing.

Recent

cases such as Preece v. House. 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah Nov. 23,
1994), and Neel v. Holden. Slip Op. No. 930447 (Utah Dec. 7, 1994),
discussed due process procedures at Board hearings setting a
release date. This matter deals instead with non-procedural issues
regarding the deference due Board findings of fact and decisions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural HistoryWalker filed this petition for extraordinary relief after the
Board of Pardons and Parole revoked his parole on August 3, 1993.
Walker, initially committed to the prison for robbery, a seconddegree felony, paroled from the prison in July 1989 and was
subsequently arrested on a charge of aggravated robbery.

(R. 8).

A jury convicted Walker of the offense but the Utah Supreme
Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial because of
suggestive identification procedures that placed the eyewitness

3

testimony

in

unpublished

doubt.
order,

(R.
June

21;

State

v.

2,

1992).

Walker,
The

Case No.

criminal

900545,

trial

court

s u b s e q u e n t l y d i s m i s s e d t h e c r i m i n a l c h a r g e b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e was
u n p r e p a r e d t o go forward on r e t r i a l .

(Walker v .

State.

9 3 0 9 0 4 9 6 4 ; Tr. H e a r i n g b e f o r e Hon. Glenn K. I w a s a k i ,
1993, at

Case No.

January 1 5 ,

11).x

While t h e d i r e c t appeal from t h e a g g r a v a t e d robbery c o n v i c t i o n
was s t i l l p e n d i n g , however, Walker p l e d g u i l t y i n December 1990 t o
t h r e e v i o l a t i o n s of h i s p a r o l e agreement:
his

listed

robbery;
offense.
Walker.
the

address;

and

(3)

(Tr.

(2)

having

been

convicted

having been c o n v i c t e d
Hearing

February 2 5 ,

before

Board

1 9 9 3 , a t 4) . 2

Board r e v o k e d W a l k e r ' s p a r o l e

rehearing for 1999.

Id.

(1) f a i l u r e t o r e s i d e a t

of

of

of

aggravated

an h a b i t u a l

Pardons,

re

Thayne

Based on t h o s e g u i l t y

pleas,

and s c h e d u l e d

In

criminal

a parole

After the criminal t r i a l court

grant

dismissed

W a l k e r ' s c r i m i n a l c a s e on remand from t h e Utah Supreme Court,

the

1

Although this citation i s to a transcript of a hearing in this matter, the
transcript has not been paginated as part of the record. The transcript i s
available at the Third District Court.
2

Walker attached copies of these transcripts to his petition as Exhibits A
and B. Although the t r i a l court reviewed these transcripts as part of i t s
decisionmaking process, the transcripts themselves were not paginated as part of
the court record. They are currently located at the Third District Court.
4

Board brought Walker before it on February 25, 1993 on a new
allegation:
id.

having committed the offense of aggravated robbery,

Walker pled not guilty to this charge but he did not change

his guilty plea to the allegation of having failed to reside at his
listed address. Id. at 5.
After an evidentiary hearing, the Board found Walker guilty of
violating his parole agreement by failing to reside at his address
of record and by having committed the offense of aggravated
robbery.

(R. 19) . The Board revoked his parole and scheduled a

rehearing date to determine whether he should be given another
parole date in the future.

Id-

Walker then filed this rule 65B

petition for extraordinary relief in Third District Court, alleging
that the Board lacked constitutionally sufficient evidence to find
he had committed aggravated robbery, even by a preponderance of the
evidence.

(R. 9). Walker attached to his rule 65B petition the

two volumes of transcripts of the Board hearing, but not the

criminal

trial

transcript

that also was before the Board.2

Walkerfs counsel at the parole revocation hearing, Mark Stringer, is a
partner in the same firm as Walker's current counsel, Rose Blakelock. Mr.
Stringer objected to the Board's use of the criminal trial transcript and
certainly knew of its significance to the Board's decision.

5

After reviewing the incomplete evidence that Walker provided
as part of the petition, the trial court agreed with Walker!s
contention that the Board lacked sufficient evidence to find that
he had committed the offense charged.

(R. 91) .

Notwithstanding

that ruling, the trial court upheld the Board's revocation based
solely on Walker's admission that he had failed to reside at his
listed address and ordered the Board to reevaluate his parole
rehearing date without relying on the aggravated robbery charge.
(R. 91-92) .
Statement of Facts
Beginning on February 25, 1993 and continuing on March 22,
1993, the Board held an evidentiary hearing to decide whether
Walker committed the offense of aggravated robbery on or about
August 18, 1989 in Salt Lake County, in violation of condition
number three of his parole agreement.

The Board listened to and

questioned witnesses, examined documentary evidence, and reviewed
parts of the criminal trial transcript.

Walker introduced into

evidence a notarized affidavit of one of the State's witnesses at
the criminal trial, Toni Christensen.

6

At trial, Christensen had given testimony damaging to Walker;
at

the Board

hearing,

damaging testimony.

Christensen1s

affidavit

recanted

that

Because Christensen could not be found and,

therefore, could not be reached by subpoena, the Board accepted the
affidavit

under

exceptions

to

the

hearsay

rule.

(R. 17).

Nevertheless, the Board found Christensen1s trial testimony more
credible and disbelieved the recantation.

(R. 18).

After reviewing the criminal trial transcript and the live
testimony at the revocation hearing, the Board concluded that
Walker violated his parole agreement through committing the offense
of aggravated robbery.

Because of concern about the validity of

the eyewitness identification testimony, the Board specifically
disregarded that evidence. (R. 16-17).

In its Amended Findings of

Facts and Conclusions of Law, R. 15-19, attached as Addendum C, the
Board found numerous facts based on the evidence before it:

(1)

two days before the robbery, Walker asked Toni Christensen to get
him a gun so that he could "make some

money"; (2) on that same

day, Christensen obtained her father's silver-colored revolver and
gave it to Walker; (3)

employees of the Taco Bell described the

robber as a person who stood between 6f and 6f4" in height, with

7

blue eyes with wrinkles around them, light brown or sandy blond
hair, carrying a silver-colored revolver; (4) it was the practice
of Taco Bell employees to place loose change in rolls wrapped in
"Taco Bell" wrappers; (5) the robber drove away in a car identified
as

belonging

to

Thomas

Bridwell,

the

brother

of

Walker's

girlfriend, Linda Rice; (6) Shelly Manwell testified at the trial
that Walker came to her apartment on August 18, 1989, the day of
the robbery, carrying a moneybag that contained rolls of coins
wrapped in plastic with "Taco Bell" on them; (7) Manwell testified
that he carried a revolver, appeared nervous and upset, and was
wearing levis and tennis shoes; (8) the Board noted Walker's
personal appearance, he stands between 6! and 6f4" in height, has
blue eyes with wrinkles around them, and has light brown hair.
gPMMARY OF THE ARSPMENT
The trial court erred because it did not apply the correct
appellate standard of review.

Walker's rule 65B petition actually

was a request that the trial court carry out an appellate-style
review of the Board's revocation hearing.

Because it was an

appeal, Walker was obligated to marshal the evidence in support of
the Board's findings and demonstrate clear error.

8

Not only did

Walker fail to marshal the evidence but he provided the trial court
with an incomplete record, ignoring the primary source in support
of the Boardfs decision: the trial transcript of Walkerfs criminal
adjudication.
Due to these failures, the trial court was obliged to accept
the Boardfs findings and proceed to determine the accuracy of the
Board's
facts.

conclusions of law and application of the law to the
Essentially, this step in the appellate process merely

required the court to decide if the findings established the
elements of aggravated robbery by the constitutional burden of
proof applicable to revocation proceedings:
evidence.

preponderance of the

The findings demonstrate that Walker robbed a Taco Bell

store and used a gun to carry it out.

Because these facts

establish aggravated robbery, the trial court should have accepted
the Board's revocation decision and denied Walker's rule 65B
petition.
ARgUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REVIEWED EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
BOARD OF PARDONS DE NOVO, REWEI6HIN6 THE EVIDENCE AND
JUDGING CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; THEREFORE, BECAUSE THE
COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY DEFER TO THE BOARD, ITS JUDGMENT
MUST BE VACATED.

9

In substance, Walker's rule 65B petition requested the trial
court

to conduct

proceeding.

appellate

review of the Board's

revocation

In re Discharge of Jones. 720 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah

1986); Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil. Gas & Mining. 675 P.2d

1135, 1139-40 (Utah 1983); Erkman y, civil Service Cpmm'n, 198 p.2d
238, 240 (Utah 1948); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d
23, 26 (Utah App. 1991); Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Dep't of
Health. 797 P.2d 438, 443-44 (Utah App. 1990); Davis County v.
Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704, 711 (Utah App. 1988) ; £££ also Craig
v. State. 844 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Idaho App. 1992) (appeal of district
court decision affirming parole commission revocation); In re
Appeal of Banks. 630 P.2d 1131, 1133-34

(Kan. 1981) (appeal of

administrative decision not to build health facility).
Because this case was an appellate proceeding, the trial court
should have required Walker to marshal the evidence before the
Board and demonstrate clear error.
J. Utah Standards

of Appellate

Norman H. Jackson, 7 Utah Bar

Review

9, 13 (1994); Alta Indus.

Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Utah 1993); Kennecott Corp, y,
State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993).

Not only did

Walker not marshal the evidence, but the evidence he did supply to

10

the district court was incomplete.4

The trial court's resulting

obligation then to accept the Board's findings of fact as correct
was required, not just by the marshaling doctrine, Crockett v.
Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992)(because of failure to
marshal

evidence,

appellate

findings), but also by

court

assumes

record

supports

"elementary principles of appellate

review," Sawyers v. Sawyers. 558 P.2d 607, 608 (Utah 1976) (in the
absence of a record, findings are presumed to have been supported
by admissible, competent, and substantial evidence).
Additionally, the trial court erred when it acted as the
initial factfinder and substituted its judgment for the Board1s. In
a hearing held to clarify his ruling, Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
expressed his understanding of his authority to review the Boardfs
decision.
But when there i s c o n f l i c t and contra-affidavit or
testimony then the court - - then I look as a finder of
fact and was not persuaded, under the f a c t s and the
a l l e g a t i o n s at that time, that there was s u f f i c i e n t - that i t was s u f f i c i e n t enough before the board to make
the finding that he, in f a c t ,
committed the crime of
The Board's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
demonstrate that the primary evidence i n support of the Board's d e c i s i o n was the
criminal t r i a l testimony, not the two days of hearings and a f f i d a v i t s before the
it.
Walker's s e l e c t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the most favorable evidence does not
appropriately marshal the evidence. Ona i n t e r n ' 1 . (U.S.A.) v. m h Ave. Corp..
850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993).
11

second degree robbery, further because t h e r e was never
ever any subsequent conviction on t h a t case.
(Tr. Hearing before Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki, Walker v. S t a t e . Case
No. 930904964, January 24, 1994, a t 6-7).
This quotation shows two fundamental
c o u r t f s approach t o t h i s case.

errors

in the

trial

F i r s t , as an a p p e l l a t e court,

it

should not have reweighed the evidence or re-judged the c r e d i b i l i t y
of witnesses. 5
Board

did

Walker's

not

Second, the t r i a l court misconstrued the law.
need

parole.

a criminal
Ward v.

conviction

Smith.

573

before

P. 2d

781,

it

The

revoked

782

(Utah

1977)("[C]riminal a c t i v i t y i s a condition of p a r o l e , however, a
conviction i s not a p r e r e q u i s i t e [to revocation] .
evidence

produced

at

trial

which

results

in

On the contrary,
acquittal

may

n e v e r t h e l e s s be used as a b a s i s for parole r e v o c a t i o n . " ) .
Had the t r i a l court c o r r e c t l y applied the marshaling doctrine
and the requirement for a complete record, i t would have been bound
t o the Board's f i n d i n g s .

Crockett/ 836 P.2d a t 820; Sawyer. 558

5

The most g l a r i n g d i f f e r e n c e between the Board's judgment and the
t r i a l c o u r t ' s concerned the testimony and a f f i d a v i t of Toni Christensen.
At
t r i a l , Ms. Christensen gave testimony damaging t o Walker. At the Board hearing,
Walker produced am a f f i d a v i t from Christensen i n which she recanted that
testimony.
In i t s amended f i n d i n g s , the Board s p e c i f i c a l l y d i s c r e d i t s the
a f f i d a v i t , primarily because Christensen did not p e r s o n a l l y t e s t i f y a t the
hearing and, therefore, was not subject t o cross-examination as she had been at
the t r i a l . (R. 1 7 ) . The t r i a l court, however, b e l i e v e d the a f f i d a v i t . (R. 9 1 ) .

12

P.2d

at

608;

State

v.

Nine

thousand

Ong

hundred

Ninetv-Nine

Dollars, United States Currency, 791 P.2d 213, 217 (Utah A P P .
1990)("Since counsel failed to provide this court with all relevant
evidence bearing on the issues raised on appeal . . .

we can only

presume that the judgment was supported by sufficient evidence.").6
Assuming the accuracy of the Board!s findings, as it was obligated
to do, the trial court should then have reviewed the accuracy of

Even if Walker had marshaled the evidence, the trial court would have
been obligated to affirm the findings of fact if they were based on "substantial
evidence" as that term was defined in Deo't of Admin. Services v. Public Service
Comm'n. 658 P.2d 601, 609 (Utah 1983). The UAPA "substantial evidence" test is
not appropriate because the Board is not subject to that Act. Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-l(2)(c) (Supp. 1994). In Admin. Services. the Utah Supreme Court held
that agency findings of fact may not be overturned if supported by "evidence of
any substance whatever," a standard of great deference that gives less latitude
for judicial review. Admin. Services, 658 P.2d at 609; see sl&Sl SEMECO v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1172-73 (Durham, J. dissenting)(comparing
substantial evidence standard in UAPA with standard in Admin. Services). This
standard of deference also correlates closely with the broad discretion courts
give the Board in other parole issues, Preece v. House. 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,
12 (Utah Nov. 23, 1994);

Lancaster v. Utah Board of Pardons. 869 P.2d 945, 947

(Utah 1994), and the legislature's prohibition on judicial review of Board
decisions in Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (Supp. 1994).
The Supreme Court's decision in Ward v. Smith explicitly adopted a standard
of broad deference as early as 1977:
The extent of judicial inquiry into parole
revocation is obviously limited by the very nature of
the proceeding. The plenary authority of the Board of
Pardons should not be disturbed in the absence of a
dear abuse of its rightful discration.
Hard/ 573 P.2d at 782 (emphasis added).

13

the Board's conclusions of law and application of the law to the
facts. Crockett. 836 P.2d at 820. That is, the trial court should
simply have reviewed the Board's Amended Findings of Fact and
determined whether those findings met the elements of aggravated
robbery.
Even a perfunctory review of the findings show that they
establish those elements. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990) defines
aggravated robbery as the commission of a robbery during which the
robber "uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon." Although the
Board disregarded the eyewitness identification testimony of the
Taco Bell employees, (R. 16-17) , the findings of fact establish, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that Walker was the perpetrator of
a robbery and he used a gun to carry it out.

These are the

elements of an aggravated robbery and the Board's findings met each
of them with constitutionally sufficient evidence. Therefore, the
trial court should have accepted the Board's judgment and should
have denied Walker's request for extraordinary relief.

14

CONCLUSION
The Board respectfully requests that the Court vacate the
trial court's order and remand to the trial court solely for entry
of an order denying Walker's petition for extraordinary relief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 3D ^

day of December 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

faith Li kjs^Jtkte
James H. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM

A

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of
committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined
in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be
considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead
Corporation

77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority.
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by
majority decision when and under what conditions, subject to this
chapter and other laws of the state, persons committed to serve
sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional
facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment
or as otherwise limited by law, may be released upon parole,
pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures,
or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or
terminated.
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct
hearings. The chair shall appoint members to the panels in any
combination and in accordance with rules promulgated by the
board, except in hearings involving commutation and pardons. The
chair may participate on any panel and when doing so is chair of
the panel. The chair of the board may designate the chair for any
other panel.
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or
restitution remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted
or sentence terminated, except after a full hearing before the
board or the board's appointed examiner in open session. Any
action taken under this subsection other than by a majority of
the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board.
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a
full hearing before the board.
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings,
rehearings, and parole revocation hearings, timely prior notice
of the time and place of the hearing shall be given to the
defendant, the county or district attorney's office responsible
for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law
enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and
conviction, and whenever possible, the victim or the victim's
family.
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family
shall include information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any
related rules made by the board under that section. This
information shall be provided in terms that are reasonable for
the lay person to understand.
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole in cases
involving paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of
sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are
final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this
section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil

judgment.
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or
limitation of the governor's power to grant respite or reprieves
in all cases of convictions for offenses against the state,
except treason or conviction on impeachment. However, respites or
reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the Board of
Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue
or terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the
punishment, or pardon the offense as provided. In the case of
conviction for treason, the governor may suspend execution of the
sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its
next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or commute
the sentence, or direct its execution.
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions
offenders serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have
restitution ordered, or have their fines or forfeitures remitted,
or their sentences commuted or terminated, the Board of Pardons
and Parole shall consider whether the persons have made or are
prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with
the standards and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition
of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, or
commutation or termination of sentence.

(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead
Corporation
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LORENZO K. MILLER (5761)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
330 South 300 East, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2525
Telephone: (801) 575-1600
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THAYNE LARRY WALKER,
ORDER
Petitioner,
v.

:
:
Case No. 930904964 HC

THE STATE OF UTAH, et al,,
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
Respondents.

:

The above-entitled matter came before this court on November
11, 1993 and January 24, 1994. Respondents were represented by
Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, and Petitioner was
present and represented by Rosemond G. Blakelock.

The court,

having entered its ruling by minute entry on November 30, 1993,
now makes the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.

Petitioner is lawfully imprisoned at the Utah State

Prison for the crimes of robbery, a second degree felony and
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third
degree felony.

These sentences are running consecutively.
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2.

Petitioner's sentences of imprisonment will not expire

until November 2010.
3.

On July 25, 1989, Petitioner was paroled from the

prison by order of the Utah Board of Pardons.
4.

On February 25, 1993, Petitioner received a parole

revocation hearing before the Board that was continued on March
29, 1993; at which time, the Board heard testimony and received
evidence on the allegations that Petitioner had violated his
Parole Agreement.
5.

Subsequently, the Board found Petitioner guilty of

violating his Parole Agreement by having committed the offense of
aggravated robbery and by having failed to reside at his
residence of record.
6.

The Board revoked Petitioner's parole date and ordered

his re-incarceration at the prison based upon the violations.
7.

Written findings and conclusions were prepared by the

Board detailing and explaining the Board's decision.
8.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

on or about September 2, 1993, challenging the actions of the
Board in revoking his parole.
9.

An evidentiary hearing was held before this court on

November 11, 1993.
10.

On November 30, 1993, this court issued a minute entry
2
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denying in part and granting in part, Respondents' Motion to
Dismiss.
11.

Respondents' counsel, Lorenzo K. Miller, requested a

hearing and clarification on the minute entry of November 30,
1993.

Accordingly, on January 24, 1994, the court clarified its

minute entry.
12.

The court found, after examination of the transcripts,

the court's file, and counsels' arguments, that there was
insufficient and evidence before the Board to find that
Petitioner committed the crime of aggravated robbery.
13.

Specifically, the court found that the affidavits and

testimony from Toni Christensen and Linda Rice conflicted with
the testimony at trial and based upon those conflicts, the Board
had insufficient evidence to conclude Petitioner committed the
offense of aggravated robbery.
14.

However, based on the uncontested admissions of

Petitioner, the court found sufficient evidence for the Board to
revoke Petitioner's parole based upon the violation of failing to
reside at a residence of record.
Having made the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the
court orders the following:
1.

Respondents' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and

denied in part.

3

2.

Petitioner's requested relief is granted m

part and

denied in part.
3.

The Board shall reconsider Petitioner's case in light

of the court's ruling-* and shall act accordingly.
DATED t h i s

2K

day of February, 1994.
BY THKJSOmT:

HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI
Third District Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid to David S. Steed.
203 South 1920 West, Provo, UT

84601, this O

1994.
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Alleged
Parole Violation of
THAYNE LARRY WALKER
USP #13057

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

nmODDCTIGN
Thayne Larry Walker was charged with violating bis parole by (t) having
failed to reside at a residence of record, and (2) having committed the
offense of Aggravated Robbery. Mr. Walker pled guilty to the residence
violation and not guilty to the allegation of Aggravated Robbery, and an
Evidentiary Hearing was scheduled on this latter charge.
Ou February 25f 1993. the matter came on for hearing before the Board of
Pardons, and again on March 29, 1993. Board members sitting were Curtis L.
Garner and Cheryl Hansen. Parolee Thayne Walker was present and represented
by counsel Mark Stringer. The State was represented by Assistant Attorney
General Ralph Adams. After hearing the evidence, the stipulations of the
parties and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised herein, the
Board now finds Thayne Larry Walker in violation of his parole by having
failed to reside at a residence of record, and by having committed the offense
of Aggravated Robbery, and hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, which constitute the decision of the Board:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Thayne Larry Walker was paroled from the Utah State Prison on July
25, 1989.
2. On or about July 27, 1989, Thayne Larry Walker left his residence of
record without notifying Adult Probation and Parole, and thereafter failed to
notify Adult Probation and Parole of his residence.
3a On or about August 16, 1989, Thayne Larry Walker asked Toni
Christensen to get him a gun so that he could "make some money".
4a On or about August 16, 1989, and in response to Mr* Walker's request,
Toni Chriatensen rode with Mr. Walker and Mr. Walker's girlfriend, Linda Rice,
to the home of Ms. Chrisleusen's father, in Murray, Utah- There she obtained
her father's silver-colored revolver and gave it to Mr* Walker. THe three of
them traveled to this location in Linda Rico's blue Toyota automobile.
5. On or about August 18, 19U9, at approximately 9:30 p.m., a Taco Bell
restaurant, located at 4199 South Redwood Road, Murray, Utah, was robbed. The
robber, who was wearing a aki mask at the time, stood between 6V and 6*4" i n Q 0 0 l 5
height, had blue eyea with wrinkles around them, light brown or sandy blond
hair, and carried a silver-colored revolver. Be wore levis, tennis ahoei* and
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6. During the robbery, the robber pointed hia gun at M B . Reid. Be told
her not to try anything or he would kill her. He walked directly to the safe*
removed the lid, and retrieved a money bag, which contained mostly loose
change. He then motioned with his gun for Ha. Reid to walk to the cash
register* She did so and gave him the money from the register. He took it,
said "thank you," and ran from the restaurant out the back door.
7. At the time of the robbery it was the ordinary practice of Taco Bell
employees to place loose coins In rolls wrapped in lfTaco Bell11 paperf and then
to place these in the safe. It is probable, but not certain, that auch rolls
were in the Taco Bell eafe at the time of the robbery.
8. Upon leaving the Taco Bell, the robber ran to a blue Toyota, Utah
license plate number 719BDP, and entered the paaaenger side. The car then
fled at a high rate of speed.
9* On the date of the robberyf Utah license plate number 719DF was
registered to a blue Toyota, owned by Thomas Bridwell.
10.

Thomas Bridwell is the brother of Linda Rice.

11. Linda Rice was and is Thayne Larry Walker'a girlfriend.
regularly drove her brother's blue Toyota.

She

12. Thayne Larry Walker resided with Linda Rice following his absconsion
from parole supervision.
13. From observation at the hearingt the Board notes that Thayne Larry
Walker stands approximately 6'2" tall, has light brown or sandy blond hair,
and blue eyes with wrinkles around them.
14. At approximately 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. on August 18, 1989, Thayne Larry
Walker appeared at the apartment of Shelly Manwell. He was carrying a
moneybag which contained coin rolls wrapped In plastic with MTaco Bell11 on
them. He also carried the gun which he had received from Toni Chriatenaen two
days previous. He was wearing levis and tennis shoes. He was "wet", appeared
nervousi entered the residence shortly thereafter and also appeared upset.
She stated that ahe felt "they" had been eeent and that ahe had hidden her car.
15* To the extent that the testimony of any witneaa ia not in accord
with the findings herein, it is not credited. Any Conclusion of Law which
should be deemed a Finding of Fact ia hereby adopted as auch.

IV1DBNTIART DISCUSSION
A.

Eyewitness Identification

. At the hearing, defense counsel made two motions in limine relating to
State's evidence of eyewitness identification.
First, the defense moved that the Board either recuse itself entirely in
this matter, or in the alternative that it bifurcate the hearing to make a
preliminary determination of the admissibility of eyewitness identification
testimony, and that those Board members making this initial determination then
recuse themselves from further aitting in this matter. Counsel cited State v.
KflffiiTfifct 817 P. 2d 774, 780-784 (Utah 1991), for the propoeition that the
0001
distinction between judge and jury must be preserved when dealing with the
foundation for eyewitness identification, and that the ultimate finder of fact
must not paaa on queations of admissibility. This motion was denied.
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Next the defense moved to dismiss all charges against Thayne Larry
Walker• The motion was based on the argument that admission of eyewitness
testimony impermissibly tainted under Ramirez would constitute a violation of
due process, and that if such evidence were excluded, the State would have no
case* This motion was also denied*
During the hearing, and over defense objections, the Board allowed
eyewitnesses to the robbery to identify Thayne Larry Walker as the robber.
The Board permitted such testimony on the ground that (1) the tarnirez
requirement of an independent determination as to admissibility applies to
jury, not bench trials; and (2) parole revocation hearings are "informal"
proceedings at which formal rules of evidence do not apply and in which any
evidentiary problems normally go to weight, rather than admissibility. At the
conclusion of the State's case, however* the Board determined that the
eyewitness testimony was in fact impermissibly tainted by the witnesses' prior
exposure, both live and photographic, to Mr* Walker. The Board therefore
disregarded all evidence of eyewitness identification in reaching it's
decision.

B Transcript Testimony from Criminal Trial
At the outset of the hearing, defense counsel alio made a motion in
limine to suppress as hearsay all transcript testimony from Mr. Walkerfe
criminal trial. Thia motion was denied. Later, during the hearing, the Board
received into evidence transcripts of trial testimony by Toni Ohristensen over
a renewed hearsay objection. This objection was overruled and the evidence
was received based upon (1) the admissibility of hearsay in parole violation
proceedings (Utah Admin. R. 671-508-(£))f and (2) the Board*6 finding that Ms.
Christensen was unavailable as a witness (Utah R. Evid., 804).

C.

Credibility of Toni Christensen Hearsay Documents

Following the admission of Toni Christensenfs trial testimony, the Board
allowed the defense-to Introduce a notarised affidavit by Ms. Christensen in
which she arguably contradicts her testimony at trial. In the affidavit, she
states that she had used drugs and alcohol at some unspecified time prior to
the trial, and that she testified as she did at the trial due to her fear of
possible criminal prosecution. The affidavit does not specify in what manner,
if any, her trial testimony was incorrect; rather, it merely states that she
could no longer recall the events of August, 1989.
A companion affidavit by attorney Robert Archuleta, as well as his
testimony at the hearing, amplifies somewhat on the Toni Christensen
affidavit. Mr. Archuleta states that Toni Christensen told him that ahe was a
drug addict and was alcohol-intoxicated at the time of her trial testimony and
that she testified as she did at trial because she was mad at Linda Rice, she
feared criminal prosecution unless she cooperated, she feared losing her
children to the State if she did not cooperate, and she expected some form of
monetary compensation in exchange for her testimony.
The Board finds Ms* Christensen?s affidavit testimony to be less reliable
than that offered at trial. In making this determination, we consider a
number of factors:
First» the trial testimony was given in a courtroom setting where the
witness's demeanor was on display and where she was subject to examination bv
V^A.«~
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Second, the trial testimony is clear, detailed, and comes directly from
the mouth of the witness herself. The affidavit, by contrastt is brief,
somewhat vague and was drafted for her by Mr. Walkerfs criminal attorney*
Third, the trial testimony is consistent with an independent account
given by Ms. Christensen to Murray Police Detective Glover. The affidavit is
not.
Fourth, the affidavit was not executed until approximately 24 months
after the trial.
Fifth, Toni Christensen was hostile toward Linda Rice (Mr. Walker's
girlfriend) at the time of trial and was cross-examined concerning this. She
was further cross-examined regarding her drug and alcohol use. By the time
she met with Mr. Walker's attorney to prepare the affidavit, however, she had
reconciled with Ms. Rice to the point that Ms. Rice was present with her at
the time of the attorney** interview. Further, it was the impression of one
of the attorneys in attendance that the women had been drinking together for
an extended period* Thus a legitimate question arises whether Toni
Christensen was pressured into making the affidavit in a moment of imparled
judgment. Unfortunately, the State has had no opportunity to explore these
-^possibilities with the witness on cross-examination.
Baaed upon these considerations, insofar as the trial testimony and
affidavit are in conflict, the Board finds the trial testimony more credible*

D.

Credibility of Linda Rice

Defense witness Linda Rice testified at the hearing that she had no
independent knowledge of the August 18th Robbery, or of who committed it. The
Board finds this aspect of Ms. Rice's testimony lacking in credibility, based
upon at least three considerations;
First, Ms. Rice's demeanor at the hearing was unconvincing. During her
testimony, she avoided eye contact with the Board, frequently appeared
ion certain as to how to testify, and seemed uncomfortable, shifting frequently
in her seat during cross-examination• Occasionally she would turn to look at
Mr* Walker before answering State counsel's questions.
Second, Ms* Rice has a motive to lie. She was herself originally charged
criminally along with Mr. Walker, and she admits that she wants their romance
to continue whenever he is released from prison*
Third, at least some of her testimony is implausible, which casts a cloud
of doubt upon the remainder* For example* her story that she never discussed
Toni Christensen's prior testimony with her, nor what Mr* Christensen might
say in a subsequent affidavit, strikes us as highly unlikely, given Ms* Rice's
obvious interest and opportunity to discuss this*

CONCLUSION OF LAW
1.

Thayne Larry Walker*was lawfully paroled,

2*

Thayne Larry Walker was charged with violation of hit parole/

3. Thayne Larry Walker was afforded all of his Constitutional and
Statutory rights and privileges.
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4. The State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that Larry Thayne Walker violated his parole*
b.
Thayne Larry Walker did in fact violate his parole by failing to
reside at a residence of record and by committing the offense of Aggravated
Robbery, the commission of the Robbery having been established at the
Evidentiary Hearing herein.
6. Either of said violations is individually sufficient, without the
other, to revoke the Parole of Thayne Larry Walker.
7. Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is
hereby adopted as such.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parole granted Thayne Larry Walker on the 25th
day of July, 1989, be and the same is hereby revoked. The matter will be
shceduled for a Rehearing in September, 1996.

2><f

Aula*?

Dated this 4»d-day of ApM*?' 1993.
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FAX TRANSMISSION CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that on the 3rd day of August, 1993, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law was sent via fax transmission, pre-paid, to:
1-375-0704:
Mark Stringer
Attorney at Law
Cotton Tree Square, Suite 9-D
2230 North University Avenue Parkway
Provo, Utah 64604
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